Abstract
Existing
software-based data erasure programs can be summarized as following the same
one-bit-return protocol: the deletion program performs data erasure and returns
either success or failure. However, such a one bit- return protocol turns the
data deletion system into a black box – the user has to trust the outcome but
cannot easily verify it. This is especially problematic when the deletion
program is encapsulated within a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), and the user
has no access to the code inside. In
this paper, we present a cryptographic solution that aims to make the data
deletion process more transparent and verifiable. In contrast to the
conventional black/white assumptions about TPM (i.e., either completely trust
or distrust), we introduce a third assumption that sits in between: namely,
“trust-but-verify”. Our solution enables a user to verify the correct
implementation of two important operations inside a TPM without accessing its
source code: i.e., the correct encryption of data and the faithful deletion of
the key. Finally, we present a proof-of-concept implementation of the SSE
system on a resource-constrained Java card to demonstrate its practical
feasibility. To our knowledge, this is the first systematic solution to the
secure data deletion problem based on
a “trust-but-verify” paradigm, together with a concrete prototype
implementation.
Aim
The
aim is to provide public verifiability for a secure data deletion system by
adopting public key cryptography.
Scope
The
scope is to present a concrete cryptographic solution, called Secure Storage
and Erasure (SSE), which enables a user to verify the correct implementation of
cryptographic operations inside a TPM without having to access its internal
source code.
Existing
system
Several Existing systems
have recognized the importance of verifiability in the secure data deletion
process which does not use any cryptography.
Disadvantages:
The
deletion program performs data erasure and returns either success or failure.
However, such a one bit- return protocol turns the data deletion system into a
black box – the user has to trust the outcome but cannot easily verify it. This
is especially problematic when the deletion program is encapsulated within a
Trusted Platform Module (TPM), and the user has no access to the code inside.
Proposed system
In
this paper, we present a cryptographic solution that aims to make the data
deletion process more transparent and verifiable. In contrast to the
conventional black/white assumptions about TPM (i.e., either completely trust
or distrust), we introduce a third assumption that sits in between: namely,
“trust-but-verify”. Our solution enables a user to verify the correct
implementation of two important operations inside a TPM without accessing its
source code: i.e., the correct encryption of data and the faithful deletion of
the key. Finally, we present a proof-of-concept implementation of the SSE
system on a resource-constrained Java card to demonstrate its practical
feasibility.
Advantages
The
main advantage is to enable a user to verify the correct implementation of two
important operations inside a TPM without accessing its source code: i.e., the
correct encryption of data and the faithful deletion of the key.
System
architecture:
SYSTEM CONFIGURATION
HARDWARE REQUIREMENTS:-
· Processor - Pentium –III
·
Speed - 1.1 Ghz
·
RAM - 256 MB(min)
·
Hard
Disk - 20 GB
·
Floppy
Drive - 1.44 MB
·
Key
Board - Standard Windows Keyboard
·
Mouse - Two or Three Button Mouse
·
Monitor -
SVGA
SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS:-
·
Operating
System : Windows 7
·
Front
End : JSP AND SERVLET
·
Database
: MYSQL
·
Tool :NETBEANS
REFERENCE:
Hao, F.,Clarke, D. ;
Zorzo, A. “DELETING SECRET DATA WITH PUBLIC VERIFIABILITY” Dependable and
Secure Computing, IEEE Transactions on
(Volume:PP , Issue: 99 ) April
2015
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