ABSTRACT:
Side-channel
analysis (SCA) exploits the information leaked through unintentional outputs
(e.g., power consumption) to reveal the secret key of cryptographic modules. The
real threat of SCA lies in the ability to mount attacks over small parts of the
key and to aggregate information over different encryptions. The threat of SCA
can be thwarted by changing the secret key at every run. Indeed, many
contributions in the domain of leakage resilient cryptography tried to achieve
this goal. However, the proposed solutions were computationally intensive and
were not designed to solve the problem of the current cryptographic schemes. In
this paper, we propose a generic framework of lightweight key updating that can
protect the current cryptographic standards and evaluate the minimum
requirements for heuristic SCA-security. Then, we propose a complete solution
to protect the implementation of any standard mode of Advanced Encryption
Standard. Our solution maintains the same level of SCA-security (and sometimes
better) as the state of the art, at a negligible area overhead while doubling
the throughput of the best previous work
AIM
The
aim of this paper is to protect the implementation of any standard mode of
Advanced Encryption Standard.
SCOPE
The
scope of this paper is to be maintains the same level of SCA-security (and
sometimes better) as the state of the art, at a negligible area overhead.
EXISTING
SYSTEM
The
design of countermeasures against SCA attacks is a vast research field.
Contributions in this regard fall into three categories: Hiding, Masking and
Leakage Resiliency independently if the puzzle function is non-parallelizable
(e.g. modular square root puzzle and Time-lock puzzle Hiding depends on
breaking the link between intermediate variables and the observable leakage by
minimizing the signal-to-noise ratio within the trace. This can be achieved
using balanced circuits and/or noise generators. Masking depends on breaking
Eve’s ability to calculate hypothetical intermediate variables, by splitting
the useful information into n shares based on random variable(s). The random
variables are generated on-the-fly and discarded afterwards. Each share is
processed independently. The final outputs (of each share) are combined to
retrieve the original output. Similarly, cryptographic modules supported with
masking require more than double the area Leakage resiliency depends on using a
fresh key for every execution of the cryptographic module hence, prevents
aggregating information about any
secret. Leakage resiliency is achieved by utilizing a key-updating mechanism
(aka re-keying or key-rolling). Although leakage resilient primitives can be
implemented using unprotected cores, the overall performance is at least halved
DISADVANTAGES:
- The real threat of SCA lies in the ability to mount attacks over small parts of the key and to aggregate information over different encryptions
- Indeed, many contributions in the domain of leakage resilient cryptography tried to achieve this goal
PROPOSED SYSTEM
To propose a generic framework of lightweight
key updating that can protect the current cryptographic standards and evaluate
the minimum requirements for heuristic SCA-security. Then, we propose a
complete solution to protect the implementation of any standard mode of
Advanced Encryption Standard. Our solution maintains the same level of
SCA-security (and sometimes better) as the state of the art, at a negligible
area overhead while doubling the throughput of the best previous work
ADVANTAGES
- To protect the implementation of any AES mode of operation.
- AES itself achieving negligible area overhead and very small performance overhead.
SYSTEM CONFIGURATION
HARDWARE REQUIREMENTS:-
· Processor - Pentium –III
· Speed - 1.1 Ghz
· RAM - 256 MB(min)
· Hard Disk - 20 GB
· Floppy Drive - 1.44 MB
· Key Board - Standard
Windows Keyboard
· Mouse - Two or Three Button Mouse
· Monitor - SVGA
SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS:-
·
Operating
System : Windows 7
·
Front
End :
JSP AND SERVLET
·
Database :
MYSQL
REFERENCE:
Schaumont,
P., Taha,
M. “KEY UPDATING FOR LEAKAGE RESILIENCY
WITH APPLICATION TO AES MODES OF OPERATION”, IEEE Transactions on Information
Forensics and Security, VOL 10, ISS 3, DECEMBER 2014.
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